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Abstract. The research analyzes the determinant of corporate governance characteristic in relation to company performance in
family firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2004-2009. The research uses quantitative approach, explanatory type and uses numerical data as secondary data obtained from various sources. The result shows that only PER variable is
significantly influenced by corporate governance characteristic with proxies of ownerships, board size, and board composition,
and controlled with the variables of sales, firm age, firm leverage, tangibility, firm size, growth, and debt in public firms listed
in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2004-2009; in general, investors basically perceive company performance from
the market value ratio in the form of company’s stock price interchange instead of the profitability ratio with the proxies of
ROA and ROE; the variables of ownerships, board size, and board composition statistically do not affect ROA, ROE, and PER.
Keywords: corporate governance, company performance, and market value ratio.
Abstrak. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk menganalisis determinan dari corporate governance characteristic dalam kaitannya dengan company performance pada family firm yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2004-2009. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif, tipe eksplanasi dan menggunakan data numerik sebagai data sekunder
yang diperoleh dari berbagai sumber. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pada dasarnya hanya variabel PER yang secara signifikan dipengaruhi oleh characteristic corporate governance yang diproksikan dengan ownerships, board
size, dan board composition dan di kontrol dengan variabel sales, firm age, firm leverage, tangibility, firm size, growth,
dan debt pada perusahaan publik yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2004-2009; hasil juga menunjukkan bahwa secara umum investor pada dasarnya hanya melihat kinerja perusahaan dari market value ratio berupa pergerakan harga saham suatu perusahaan bukan pada profitability ratio yang diproksikan dengan ROA dan ROE; variabel owerships, board size, dan board composition secara statistik tidak berpengaruh terhadap ROA, ROE, dan PER.
Kata Kunci : corporate governance, kinerja perusahaan, corporate governance, characteristic, dan market value
ratio

INTRODUCTION
Corporate Governance was born out of the concept
related to management monitoring in the process of
good decision making. La Porta et. al. (2000) affirm
that Corporate Governance is a monitoring mechanism
aimed to protect investor assets from exploitation done
by the insider. La Porta et. al. (2000) further state that
Corporate Governance appears when the insiders in
a corporation have motivation and chance to utilize
investor assets for their personal interests. The essence
of Corporate Governance implementation is to ensure the
protection and monitoring on investor assets; there is no
more effective monitoring mechanism compared to direct
monitoring by the stakeholders, even though through
delegation to certain party.
The monitoring is reflected in a set of system regulating
and controlling a company to create added value for the
interests of the entire stakeholders in a company. This set

of system is organized in the form of company’s organs,
consisting of directors, board of commissioner, and
Stakeholders General Meeting, as important components
of a company. Those organs work in integrated manner
to create added value for the interests of the company.
This means, the success and survival of a firm or
organization are very much dependent on the ability of its
organizational apparatuses (the firm’s organs) to control
the whole resources it owns (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) further state that the firm’s
leading component (in this case the boards, both the
board of directors and the board of commissioners) hold
a significant control in managing resources and assisting
the firm’s strategy design.
The research analyzes the determinants of corporate
governance characteristic in relation to company
performance in family firms and non-family firms listed
in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 20042009. The main determinant of corporate governance
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characteristic refers to three important measurements, i.e.
board size, board composition, and managerial ownership
that are later controlled by several variables, i.e.: sales,
firm age, financial leverage, asset tangibility, firm size,
growth opportunities, and debt. Managerial ownership
is portrayed in two different models. First, managerial
ownership is portrayed as the percentage of managerial
stock ownership (director or commissioner) on the firm’s
total stocks. Second, managerial ownership is portrayed
as a dummy variable representing family firms and nonfamily firms.
Generally the research aims to: (1) analyze the
characteristic of family firm and non-family firm on
public companies in Indonesia, particularly in its relation
to the strengthening of the Board of Commissioner’s
role in the implementation of Corporate Governance,
and (2) to analyze the influence of corporate governance
characteristic on the performance of family firm and nonfamily firm in public companies listed in Indonesia Stock
Exchange in the period of 2004-2009
The research is based on other researches done by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as well as Fama and Jensen
(1983) indicating that the principals will implement
thorough monitoring on the agents’ conducts (executive
directors of the board and the overall management)
that tend to benefit their personal interests. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) further
assert that: Family leadership enables the owners of the
firm to exercise full control over the corporate insiders
(paid executive directors of the board) and the overall
management. This frees the family controlled firms from
incurring a huge agency cost and can therefore benefit
the promoters enormously. Further, this ensures a lot of
involvement from the promoter of the firm ultimately
leading to the fullest utilization of the resources and other
capabilities of promoter.
The first proposition further developed is family
firm tends to reduce agency problems. Such opinion is
based on the researches by Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Fama and Jensen (1983), Casson (1999), Chami (1999),
and Maury (2006), asserting that the great ownership
by the firm’s promoter family contributes to the less
conflict between the firm owner (principals) and manager
(agents). The individuals from the founder family will
become the executive board of the firm. In this case, the
kinship formed becomes the fundamental business reason
of the firm with family ownership structure in order to
reduce agency problem.
The second proposition is family firm tends to have
better performance compared to non-family firm,
although some researches also show contrary results.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) affirm that a firm’s
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value measured by Tobins Q will increase when the
promoter family has a strong position in the firm. A firm
established by most of family members basically has
an altruism characteristic, where familial relation will
itself encourage the great loyalty and commitment to the
firm, and eventually create a more effective management
and support a better performance of the firm (La Porta,
et. al, 1998). Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicates that
family firm performance is better than non-family firm
performance. Saito (2008) finds that family firm has a
better performance than non-family firm if the firm if it
is managed by promoter family who is active in the firm
management. Different result will be obtained if family
firm is managed by the descendants of the promoter.
Basically corporate governance is a system related to
the firm management. It is related to mechanism of power
division and management organization in order to achieve
the firm goals. Monks and Minow (1995) states that:
“.... the single major challenge addressed by corporate
governance is how to grant managers enormous and
discretionary power over the conduct of the business
while holding then accountable for the use of the power.”
The opinion is further strengthened by Turnbull (1997)
who affirms that: “corporate governance describes all the
influence affecting the institutional processes including
those for appointing the controllers and/or regulators....”
Turnbull (1997) emphasizes that the firm management
must consider the factors of “controllers and regulators”.
Both are significant factors affecting corporate governance
implementation. Lukviarman (2004) defines corporate
governance as the entire unity that includes legal, cultural
aspects, and other institutional components that determine
what conduct done by the corporation, which party control
the corporation, how the controlling is implemented,
what are the risks and benefits of the activities conducted.
The main factor that becomes corporate governance
focus is the firm or corporation management based on the
capability of organization leaders in controlling the whole
activities of the firm, both internal and external.
The focus is manifested through the central role of
two business organization actors, i.e. Board of Director
(BOD) and Board of Commissioners (BOC)–(Nugroho,
Umanto, and Kusumastuti, 2011). The Board of Directors
(BOD) is the leading component that works full time,
prohibited to have other job; BOD’s central role is in
its activities of operationally managing the firm through
various strategic decisions. In the meanwhile, Board of
Commissioners (BOC) is commissioner and independent
commissioner components as well as various committees
under them. The main function of BOC is responsible
for strategic planning process, for the firm’s risks, for
monitoring directors’ performance, monitoring the firm to
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ensure that the firm is in the condition suitable with the
policy that has been determined, monitoring the direction
and the running of the firm according to the principles of
corporate governance (Yuristisia and Lukviarman, 2010).
Capital structure composition is the reflection of
ownership structure composition in a company. The
concentration of capital ownership in a firm affects the
domination of the owner’s interests in achieving the
firm’s goals. This means the owner’s domination on
the capital structure contributes to the approach used
corporate governance implementation. Therefore the
owner’s perspective on the capital structure contribution
also means the domination of ownership interest on the
given investment and available capital toward the benefit
on values produced by the firm in the future. Ownership
structure is divided into two, i.e. family ownership and
institutional ownership. First, family ownership that is
related to spread or diversified ownership structure can
only be found in developed countries such as United
States and Britain; while in developing countries, most
companies have family ownership i.e. companies owned
or controlled by promoters of the company. Second,
institutional ownership is when institutional investors
have more assets of information source than noninstitutional investors who tend to use more relevant
information even though it is more expensive, thus
they have higher earning expectation (El-gazzar, 1998;
Bhattacharya, 2001). In the meanwhile, the classical
theory of managerial firm, asserted by Baumol (1959),
Galbraith (1967), Marris (1964), Williamson (1964) as
also cited by Gorriz and Fumas (1996), states that the
types of the firm’s ownership and control are divided
into two, i.e.: (1) the firm owned by many stakeholders
and controlled by management, (2) the firm owned and
controlled by certain family or individuals. Both types
have different influence on the company performance.
The Board of Commissioner is the representation of
stakeholders that contributes to the effectiveness of the
firm’s goals achievement in the future. The different
perspectives and interests owned by members of the
board is the interpretive approach done to achieve the
firm’s goals that affects the approach used and contributes
to the effectiveness of the firm’s goals achievement. In his
study, Knell (2006) offers a perspective on the role of the
board in a firm’s organization, that is “[t]he Board should
collectively understand the market place of the business,
the needs of the stakeholders of the business, the personal
responsibility of each director, executive or NED, to act
in the company’s best interests. Such condition leads
to diversity and uniqueness that affect the orientation
value built by the firm to deal with the opportunity and
challenge in the future. Knell (2006) asserts that“All
directors must take decisions objectively in the interests
of the company” Perceived from the role of BOC on the
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firm’s activities, the commissioner has a strong role and
contribution on goals achievement and on the firm’s value
intensification. BOC is an interactive form of individual
value that also interacts with each other in forming values,
preferences, and orientation in organizational level,
has stronger authority and bargaining power in giving
intervention and affects the firm’s management activities.
On the other side, BOC is stakeholders who play role in
educating and advising the firm’s actors, but does not
directly intervene with the firm’s management activities.
Competence, skills, independence and integrity owned by
BOC must be considered to understand the condition and
problems of a firm. Thus it is expected that the Board of
Commissioner has a better understanding and perspective
in identifying the condition and problems occurred, and
offers independent consideration and solution for the
firm management. Therefore the better the competence,
skills, and integrity of Board of Commissioner, the better
they are capable of producing excellence in providing
appropriate information, advice and suggestions while
encountering problems occurred in the firm.
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and
Jensen, 1983) basically assumed that human is a rational
actor who aims to maximize his individual profit. The
theory comes from the concept of separation between
ownership and control that later creates the behavioral
relation between principald and agents (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), where principals execute internal control
to continuously monitor agents’ behavior that tends to
prioritize their own interests. Colarossi, et al, (2008)
affirm that: ... agency relationship, than is an incomplete
contract between a principal (the family owners) and an
agent (the non-family managers). In this case agency cost
is portrayed as a relation between principals and agents,
in which promoters will become principals when they do
a contract with the executives to run the firm for them.
The agents from principals are eventually responsible in
maximizing the stakeholder profit. As the agents of the
principals, the executives sign a contract with the status
as agents, even though eventually agents have the chance
to maximize their own interests. Therefore in a modern
company, agents and principals have the motivation to
maximize their own interests. Principals invest their
funds in the company and design a managerial system to
maximize their profit; while agents bear the responsibility
to manage principals’ investments, simultaneously also
get the chance to obtain more profit.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit
(2006) define family firm as a firm where founder or
founder’s family act as officers, directors or own at least
5% of the firm’s equity. Anderson and Reeb (2003) state
that
“the family represents a unique class of shareholders
with poorly diversified portfolios, who are long term
investors (multiple generations) and often control senior
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Table 1. Research Samples Taking
Step
1
2
3
4

Procedure
Non-financial companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (PT. BEI) in the
period of 2004-2009
Non-fixed companies listed at least 5 times in the index in the period of 20042009
Non-family firms
Family firms
Total of samples

Total
220
-10
177
33
220

Table 2. Descriptive Statistic Year 2004–2009
Board_Size
Board_Com
Sales
Firm_Age
Leverage
Tangibility
Firm_Size
Growth
Debt
Man_Ownership
Number of Observation

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

2.00
0.00
13.85
0.00
-26.91
0.00
13.98
-1.00
0.00
0.00
1246

11.00
0.75
40.21
4.83
631.83
0.96
32.21
6.15
3.80
0.51
1246

4.22
0.32
27.31
3.25
1.38
0.37
27.34
0.17
0.22
0.02
1246

1.84
0.16
2.15
0.54
18.46
0.23
1.89
0.50
0.30
0.05
1246

management position. Hence, family firms are those in
which the founder and his or her relatives have a majority
stake in managing and controlling the affairs of the firm”
The opinion is then affirmed by Andres (2008) who
defines family firm as a firm whose shares are minimally
25% owned by certain family or if it is less than 25%
there are family members who hold positions in the firm’s
Board of Directors or Board of Commissioners. In the
meanwhile, Saito (2008) asserts that family firm is a firm
where the founder’s family affects the policies, strategies,
personal issues, and other parts in the firm through their
ownership and participation in the firm’s management.
The ownership of many go-public firms is predominantly
held by certain family or concentrated on a family. In this
case, a family firm is characterized by predominant or
majority ownership that is concentrated by certain family
or individual. The founder’s family usually owns the
predominant shares in a family firm (Ayub, 2008). Family
firm can also be defined as a business form where a family
gives power and strategic direction to the organization
through ownership, top management, and position in the
board (Pieper, et al, 2008).
RESEARCH METHODS
The research uses quantitative approach. It uses
numerical data as secondary data obtained from various

sources. The research is of explanatory type. (Catranti,
2009). It measures the determinant of corporate
governance characteristic by two variables, i.e. board
size and board composition on the company performance
measured by (1) ROA (Return on Asset), (2) ROE
(Return on Equity), and (3) PER (Per Earning Ratio)
of family firm and non-family firm listed in Indonesia
Stock Exchange (BEI) in the period of 2004 to 2009. The
research also uses several controlling variables, i.e.: (1)
sales, (2) firm age, (3) financial leverage, (4) firm size, (5)
growth opportunities, and (6) debt. The population in the
research is the whole companies listed in Indonesia Stock
Exchange from 2004 to 2009. The researcher uses non
probability sampling technique with purposive sampling
method.
The data collected consist of annual reports and financial
statements from the companies taken as research samples.
The secondary data used in this research consist of data
collected from Bank of Indonesia (BI), Central Bureau
of Statistics (BPS) and Financial Reports of go-public
companies obtained from Indonesia Stock Exchange (PT
BEI) and the data from internet. The companies chosen
samples are those listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange.
The data analysis is done by using descriptive statistic
to describe corporate governance characteristic and
company performance with several controlling variables,
i.e. (1) board size (BS), (2) board composition (BC), (3)
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Table 3. Comparison of Family Firms and Non-family Firms Year 2004-2009
Variable
Board_Size
Board_Com
Sales
Firm_Age
Leverage
Tangibility
Firm_Size
Growth
Debt
Man_Ownership
Number of Observation

Min
2.00
0.00
23.27
1.95
-2.41
0.00
23.54
-0.89
0.00
0.00
194

Family Firm
Max
Mean
9.00
3.96
0.67
0.33
29.47
26.70
4.04
3.09
46.99
0.99
0.94
0.37
30.38
26.70
2.53
0.10
0.84
0.19
0.32
0.02
194
194

ROA (Return on Asset), (4) ROE (Return on Equity),
and (5) PER (Price Earnings Ratio), (6) sales, (7) firm
age, (8) financial leverage, (9) firm size, (10) growth
opportunities, (11) debt, and (12) board ownership.
The researcher conducted regression analysis based on
built models to analyze the influence and relation between
corporate governance characteristic and the performance
of public family firm and non-family firm in Indonesia
during 2004-2009.
Based on the literary study, the hypothesis proposed in
the research is: There is positive influence of the corporate
governance characteristic variables on the company
performance. The research model used is basically a
modification of Anderson Reeb’s model (2003). The
modification is done on controlling variables with the
following proxies: Board Size (BS), Board Composition
(BC), Managerial Ownerships (MO), Sales, Firm Age,
Financial Leverage, Asset Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth
Opportunities, and Debt. The company performance is
measured by ROA, ROE, and PER. The research models
are:
Model 1
Firm Performance = δ0 + δ1 (Managerial Ownerships)
+ δ2 board size + δ3 board composition + δ4 (control
variables) + ε
Managerial Ownerships are portrayed as the percentage
of the number of managerial share ownership (director or
commissioner) from the independent commissioner on
the firm’s total shares.
Model 2
Firm Performance = δ0 + δ1 (Ownership form) + δ2
board size + δ3 composition + δ4 (control variables) + ε
Managerial Ownerships are portrayed as dummy
variable to differentiate family firm and non-family firm.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Std. Dev.
1.50
0.17
1.69
0.46
3.89
0.25
1.50
0.36
0.17
0.04
194

Min
2.00
0.00
13.85
0.00
-26.91
0.00
13.98
-1.00
0.00
0.00
1052

Non Family Firm
Max
Mean
11.00
4.27
0.75
0.32
40.21
27.42
4.83
3.27
631.83
1.46
0.96
0.37
32.21
27.45
6.15
0.19
3.80
0.22
0.51
0.02
1052
1052

Std. Dev.
1.90
0.16
2.21
0.55
20.03
0.22
1.93
0.52
0.32
0.05
1052

The number of initial populations for the firms being
researched is 398. Samples are chosen based on the
predetermined criteria of 210 firms from the year 2004
to 2009 consisting of 33 family firms and 177 non-family
firms. The Table 1 shows the stages of samples taking.
Based on the samples of 210 chosen firms, the
researchers measure the corporate governance
characteristic of the BOC by using the indicators of (1)
BOD size, (2) Managerial Ownership (MO), (3) Board
Composition (BC), (4) Sales (S), (5) Firm Age (FA),
and (6) Financial Leverage (FL), (7) Firm Size (FS), (8)
Growth Opportunities (GO), (9) Debt (D), (10) ROA,
(11) ROE, and (12) PER on the company performance
measured by ROA, ROE, and PER. Table 2 contains data
of descriptive statistic in the period of 2004-2009.
From the entire data in 2004-2009, the interval
for board size within six years is two to eleven people
with the majority of firms have four commissioners.
For managerial ownership, the majority of directors
or commissioners does not own shares in their firms,
though some directors or commissioners own shares with
maximum value of 51% with the average ownership of
2%. The variable of board composition during 2004 –
2009 is 32% of the total number of commissioners, and
75% at most. The definition of board composition is the
proportion of independent commissioners on the total
number of commissioners. The research finds that most
go-public firms taken as samples have fulfilled Bapepam
Regulation No. I-A.
Sales is defined as the average number of sales done by
a firm in the period of research. Based on the data in Table
2 above, the average number of sales in a year is 27.31.
Firm age reflects the age of the firm from the moment it
was first established. The average firm age is 3.25 year,
with 2004 as the base. Financial Leverage indicates the
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Table 4. Regression for the Entire Research Samples in 2004-2009 with the Managerial Ownership Proxy
Measured by Share Ownership Percentage
Variable
(Constant)
Ownership
board_size
board_com
Sales
Age
Leverage
Tangibility
Size
Growth
Debt
Sig (p-value)
R
R Square
Number of observation

ROA
.845
.675
.969
.233
.760
.531
.984
.953
.887
.877
.547
0.993
0.043
0.002
1246

Coefficients
ROE
.631
.700
.012
.891
.191
.837
.935
.152
.861
.019
.615
.094
0.114
0.013
1246

PER
.009
.258
.398
.738
.000
.063
.986
.996
.000
.697
.791
0.000
0.248
0.061
1246

Table 5. Regression for the Entire Research Samples in 2004-2009 with Managerial Ownership Proxy
Measured by the Ownership Structural Form of Family Firm and Non-family Firm
Variable
(Constant)
Ownership
Board_Size
Board_Com
Sales
Firm_Age
Leverage
Tangibility
Firm_Size
Growth
Debt
Sig (p-value)
R
R Square
Number of observation

ROA
.839
.625
.977
.227
.773
.565
.982
.981
.886
.856
.550
.992
.044
.002
1246

ratio of long term debt on the total capital added by
retained earnings. The Financial Leverage is 1.38. Asset
Tangibility describes the ratio of fixed asset number
divided by total asset number, i.e. 37% in average. Firm
Size portrays the book value of total asset owned by a firm.
Firm size is measured by natural log book value from total
asset. The research result shows that in average the book

Coefficients
ROE
.650
.801
.012
.887
.197
.860
.935
.161
.849
.020
.624
.097
.144
.013
1246

PER
.011
.535
.394
.728
.000
.075
.987
.914
.000
.725
.823
.000
.246
.061
1246

value owned by the firms is 27.34. Growth Opportunities
portray the firm growth measured by seeing the growth of
sales number in a firm. In average the firms’ sales growth
from 2004-2009 is 17%. Debt describes the ratio of Long
Term Debt divided by Total Asset. In average the rate of
the sample firms’ Long Term Debt divided by the total
asset owned is 22%.
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Table 6. Regression for the Entire Research Samples in 2004-2009 with Managerial Ownership Proxy
Measured by Share Ownership Percentage in Family Firms
Variable
(Constant)
Ownership
board_size
board_com
Sales
Age
Leverage
Tangibility
Size
Growth
Debt
Sig (p-value)
R
R Square
Number of observation

ROA
.541
.350
.002
.885
.135
.678
.523
.720
.063
.147
.919
0.044
0.309
0.095
194

Coefficients
ROE
.504
.972
.122
.970
.013
.562
.303
.663
.007
.654
.251
.180
0.267
0.071
194

PER
.380
.230
.825
.034
.449
.007
.971
.087
.623
.972
.672
0.088
0.29
0.084
194

Table 7. Regression for the Entire Research Samples in 2004-2009 with Managerial Ownership Proxy
Measured by Share Ownership Percentage in Non-family Firms
Variable
(Constant)
Ownership
board_size
board_com
Sales
Age
Leverage
Tangibility
Size
Growth
Debt
Sig (p-value)
R
R Square
Number of observation

ROA
.787
.671
.983
.223
.757
.587
.977
.928
.841
.856
.546
0.993
0.047
0.002
1052

The interval of board size from 2004 to 2009 is
from two to eleven people with the majority have four
commissioners. This shows that there is an attempt to
limit agency problem and conflict interest. Moreover there
have been people set to monitor and control the running of
the firm which is represented by managerial performance.
However, from the many public firms, a few does not have

Coefficients
ROE
.554
.711
.014
.865
.187
.817
.944
.121
.977
.026
.650
.112
0.121
0.015
1052

PER
.007
.254
.366
.676
.000
.076
.978
.629
.000
.706
.838
0.000
0.257
0.066
1052

commissioners; though not majority, this shows that few
firms still does not have good organizational structure.
Furthermore, managerial ownership data show that
the majority of directors or commissioners in public
firms is categorized good due to their share ownership
of 2%. This shows that the majority of independence
rate in the firms is high. We can say that the directors or
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commissioners play significant roles in representing the
opinion of stakeholders in Stakeholder General Meeting
(SGM), in the monitoring and in independently taking
decision without any intervention on the share ownership
in the firm.
For board composition, most public firms have
fulfilled the requirements from Bapepam (Capital Market
Supervisory Agency) where the average composition
of independent commissioners on the total number of
commissioners is 32%. The data above is close to the
minimum limit stipulated by Bapepam i.e. 33%. This
shows that the independence rate of the public firms is
good.
If compared between family firms and non-family
firms, then we will acquire the data in table 3 above.
From the data in 2004-2009, the interval for board size
in family firms for six years is in between the range of
two to nine people with the majority of firms have four
commissioners; while for non-family firms for six years
is in between the range of two to eleven people with
the average of four commissioners. For managerial
ownership, in family firms, the majority of directors or
commissioners does not own shares in the firms, though
some commissioners own shares with maximum value of
32% with the average ownership of 2%. In the non-family
firms, the majority of directors or commissioners does not
own shares in the firms, although some commissioners
own shares with the maximum value of 51% with the
average ownership of 2%.
The variable of board composition, during 2004–
2009, for family firms is 33% from the total number of
commissioners, and 67% at most; while for non-family
firms, is 75% at most with the average value of 32%.
The definition of board composition is the proportion
of independent commissioners on the total number of
commissioners. Furthermore, the research finds that most
go-public companies have conformed with Bapepam
Regulation No. I-A.
The interval of board size during 2004–2009 both in
family firms and non-family firms is from two to eleven
people with the majority of firms has four commissioners.
This shows that there is an attempt to suppress agency
problem and conflict interest. Moreover there have been
people set to monitor and control the running of the
firms which is represented by managerial performance.
However from the many public firms, few still does not
have commissioners, though the majority do so; this
shows that few firms is still lack of good organizational
structure.
The data of managerial ownership shows that both
family firms and non-family firms have the majority of
commissioners under the category of good since their
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share ownership is 0%. The highest share ownership is
0.51 which is still in normal limit. It can be said that the
roles of commissioners are in representing the opinion
of shareholders in Stakeholders General Meeting, and in
monitoring and independently taking decision without
any intervention on the share ownership in the firms.
For board composition, both family firms and nonfamily firms have mostly fulfilled Bapepam requirements
where the average composition of independent
commissioners on the total number of commissioners
is 32%. The above data have approached the minimum
limit of Bapepam i.e. 33%. This shows that the rate of
independence of the public firms is good.
After conducting descriptive statistic on the board
governance characteristic of the firms taken as samples,
a regression analysis is done from variables of corporate
governance characteristic on company performance
measured with ROA, ROE and PER. The regression
analysis is done for variables of: Managerial ownership
(measured with the share ownership percentage),
controlled by variables of board size and board composition
(showing corporate governance characteristic), sales, firm
age, financial leverage, tangibility, firm size, growth, and
debt on ROA, ROE and PER; Managerial ownership
(measured with dummy variable to differentiate family
firm and non-family firm) controlled by variables of
board size and board composition (showing corporate
governance characteristic), sales, firm age, financial
leverage, tangibility, firm size, growth, and debt on ROA,
ROE and PER.
Managerial ownership (measured by share ownership
percentage) controlled by variables of board size and
board composition (showing corporate governance
characteristic), sales, firm age, financial leverage,
tangibility, firm size, growth, and debt on ROA, ROE and
PER.
The result of regression shown in Table 4 shows that
in general, only PER variable is significantly influenced
by corporate governance characteristic with the proxies
of Ownerships, Board Size, and Board Composition,
controlled by variables of Sales, Firm Age, Firm Leverage,
Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth, and Debt. If alpha 10%
is used, the variables of ROE and PER are significantly
influenced by corporate governance characteristic with
the proxies of Ownerships, Board Size, and Board
Composition controlled by the variables of Sales, Firm
Age, Firm Leverage, Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth,
and Debt. The result shows that basically investors only
measure a company performance from market value
ratio in the form of its share price interchange, instead
of from profitability ratio with the proxies of ROA and
ROE. The result shows that the variables of Ownerships,
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Board Size, and Board Composition statistically do not
influence ROA, ROE, and PER.
Managerial ownership (measured with dummy
variable to differentiate family firm and non-family firm)
controlled by variables of board size and board composition
(showing corporate governance characteristic), sales, firm
age, financial leverage, tangibility, firm size, growth, and
debt on ROA, ROE and PER.
The result of regression shown in Table 5 shows that
in general only PER variable is significantly influenced
by corporate governance characteristic with the proxies of
Form on Ownerships, Board Size, and Board Composition
controlled by variables of Sales, Firm Age, Firm
Leverage, Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth, and Debt. The
result is only slightly different if the proxy of Ownership
is portrayed by the share ownership percentage. If
alpha 10% is used, then the variables of ROE and PER
are significantly influenced by corporate governance
characteristic with the proxies of Ownerships, Board Size,
and Board Composition controlled by variables of Sales,
Firm Age, Firm Leverage, Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth,
and Debt. The result shows that basically investors only
measure a company performance from market value ratio
in the form of its share price interchange, instead of from
profitability ratio with the proxies of ROA and ROE.
Other result shows that the variables of Ownerships,
Board Size, and Board Composition statistically do not
influence ROA, ROE, and PER.
Managerial ownership (measured by share ownership
percentage) controlled by variables of board size and
board composition (showing corporate governance
characteristic), sales, firm age, financial leverage,
tangibility, firm size, growth, and debt on ROA, ROE and
PER in family firms.
The regression result in table 6 shows that in general in
family firms only ROA variable is significantly influenced
by corporate governance characteristic with the proxies
of Ownerships, Board Size, and Board Composition
controlled by variables of Sales, Firm Age, Firm
Leverage, Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth, and Debt. The
result shows that investors consider family firms capable
of generating profit. In this case, Return On Asset (ROA)
is portrayed as the capability of a firm in producing
profitability if compared to its total number of asset.
Managerial ownership (measured by share ownership
percentage) controlled by variables of board size and
board composition (showing corporate governance
characteristic), sales, firm age, financial leverage,
tangibility, firm size, growth, and debt on ROA, ROE and
PER in non-family firms.
The regression result in table 7 shows that in general
in non-family firms only PER variable is significantly
influenced by corporate governance characteristic with
the proxies of Ownerships, Board Size, and Board
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Composition controlled by variables of Sales, Firm Age,
Firm Leverage, Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth, and Debt.
The result shows that basically investors only measure a
company performance from market value ratio in the form
of its share price interchange, instead of from profitability
ratio with the proxies of ROA and ROE. Other result
shows that the variables of Ownerships, Board Size, and
Board Composition statistically do not influence ROA,
ROE, and PER.
CONCLUSION
The roles of commissioner can generally be done
independently without intervention on share ownership in
the firm. The research result shows that basically only
PER variable is significantly influenced by corporate
governance characteristic with the proxies of ownerships,
board size, and board composition and controlled by
variables of sales, firm age, firm leverage, tangibility,
firm size, growth, and debt in public companies listed
in Indonesia Stock Exchange in period of 2004-2009.
Differentiation between family firms and non-family firms
produces different result, since in family firms it is the
ROA variable that is significantly influenced by corporate
governance characteristic with the proxies of ownerships,
board size, and board composition and controlled by
variables of sales, firm age, firm leverage, tangibility, firm
size, growth, and debt; while in non-family firms, it is
PER variable that is significantly influenced by corporate
governance characteristic with the proxies of ownerships,
board size, and board composition and controlled by
variables of sales, firm age, firm leverage, tangibility, firm
size, growth, and debt.
Research result shows that in general investors basically
measure a company performance from market value ratio
in the form of its share price interchange, instead of from
profitability ratio with the proxies of ROA and ROE.
Other result shows that the variables of Ownerships,
Board Size, and Board Composition statistically do not
influence ROA, ROE, and PER.
For further research it is better to use proxies that
show the involvement of family members in the firm
management, for example family management or CEO
management. Other measurements can also be used to
select the category of family firm and non-family firm,
thus the number of firms under the category of family firm
is more proportional compared to non-family firm.
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